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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the transposition of the EU 
directive on informing and consulting employees is likely to enhance voice 
and participation rights of Irish employees.  The paper assesses the reasons 
for the “voice gaps” the evidence suggests exist in Irish workplaces and 
analysing the implications of the legal changes brought in by the information 
and consultation legislation.  The paper argues that the transposition of the 
EU Directive provided a unique opportunity to bolster voice mechanisms in 
Irish workplaces and “plug” some of the gaps identified in the literature. 
However, the paper argues this opportunity has been largely squandered, as 
a result of the Irish Government’s minimalist approach to “hard” regulation of 
information and consultation rights in the transposing legislation.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, in the context of rapid industrial change and restructuring, a 
major focus of EU and Member State policy debate has been on increasing 
employee “voice” and participation at the workplace. From a business 
perspective, the Lisbon Strategy seeks to make Europe the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by better utilising and 
exploiting the advantage of comparatively well-educated European 
workforces. At the same time, there have been significant EU legislative 
developments in relation to employee rights and the protection of employees’ 
dignity, and opportunities for personal development, at work. Title III of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly protects workers' rights to information 
and consultation within the undertaking (Article II-87), while the EU has also 
been keen to promote “social dialogue” (see Articles 137-139 EC). After all, 
the knowledge-based economy that the EU is so keen to establish is 
inconceivable without the active involvement of individual employees (Sisson, 
2002). This has formed the backdrop to the passing, in 2002, of Directive 
2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in 
the European Community (hereinafter “the Directive”).  
 
At Member State level, the vast majority of the “old” EU15 have long had in 
place mechanisms providing for information and consultation of employees at 
the workplace. These range from statutory works councils (for example, in 
Germany and France), to encompassing collective agreements which, 
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although backed by legislation, are the primary means of regulating 
information and consultation in countries like Denmark and Belgium, to the 
hybrid Italian model, where a statutory framework allows for sectoral 
agreements to flesh out the detailed operations of works councils (Broughton, 
2005). Ireland and the UK are the odd ones out here as neither country has a 
general, permanent and statutory system of information and consultation or 
employee representation. 
 
This paper examines why efforts in Ireland to address the crucial issue of 
establishing robust employee communication and participation channels at 
the enterprise have met with, at best, mixed results. The paper argues that 
the Irish transposition of the Directive (which is similar in most key respects to 
the approach of the UK) by means of the Employees (Provision of Information 
and Consultation) Act 2006 (hereinafter “the Act”), is likely to be ineffective in 
significantly deepening the voice and representation rights of Irish employees.  
As we will see, the transposition of the Directive provides another example of 
the Irish State’s Janus-like approach of embracing employee voice and 
representation at the national level (through the involvement of trade unions in 
the social partnership process) while failing to promote such rights at the level 
of the enterprise (Wallace, 2003). 
 
Some caveats. The paper does not debate the benefits or otherwise of 
seeking to offer employees more voice at work. The starting point is that at 
both EU and national level (in the form of the national partnership 
agreements) the stated policy position is so to do (although, as will be outlined 
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below, there seems little consensus among the Irish social partners as to how 
this might be achieved). Furthermore, it is recognised that “voice” itself (like 
“participation”, “involvement” etc.) is a multi-faceted and complex concept 
(see Dundon et al., 2004). The intention here, therefore, is not to seek to 
unpack precise voice and involvement arrangements and how they might, or 
might not, be supported [1]. The paper simply seeks to assess how the 
Directive might have been used to bolster voice and involvement mechanisms 
in Irish workplaces.  
 
The paper is set out as follows. First, the “voluntarist” context within which 
employment regulation in Ireland takes place (including the role of social 
partnership in relation to employee voice and involvement) will be examined. 
Second, evidence of the failure of voluntarism to guarantee robust voice and 
involvement rights to Irish workers will be assessed. The manner in which the 
Directive has been transposed will be outlined briefly, before the paper goes 
on to identify precisely why the Act is unlikely to impact significantly on voice 
and involvement arrangements. 
 
Partnership, Voluntarism and Voice in the Irish 
Workplace 
The Irish industrial relations (IR) system has traditionally been based on the 
adversarial, voluntarist Anglo-Saxon model of the UK, where there is a 
relative absence of state intervention in collective employment relations (there 
is no automatic erga omnes extension of collective agreements to non-union 
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workplaces, for example) and legally imposed structures (Hyman, 1995). 
Several commentators in the UK (see, for example, Ewing and Truter, 2005) 
and Ireland have recently commented that the voluntarist system of industrial 
relations is under threat. Teague (2005), for example, has argued that it is 
now inaccurate to describe the Irish employment relations system as 
voluntarist, due to the decline in trade union density and voluntary collective 
bargaining, and the parallel expansion in individual employment rights, which 
has resulted in a transition from a bargaining-based employment relations 
system to a rights-based system.  
 
Others, like Roche (2005), however, feel that attributing major significance to 
all encompassing processes of change such as the “demise of voluntarism” is 
overly simplistic. He argues that one of the most significant developments of 
the past quarter century has been that employers and, to some extent 
employees and unions, have come to enjoy much greater latitude, within the 
law and the strictures of public policy, to choose voluntarily the employment 
relations models they wish to operate, including how they should respond to 
growing legal regulation itself. As Redmond (2004) points out, the social 
partnership agreement, Sustaining Progress, launched a proliferation of 
regulation for Ireland’s labour law. However, she identifies three themes; first, 
the proposed laws almost exclusively concern individual employment rights, 
second the majority contain anti-discrimination measures, and finally, almost 
all are inspired (or required) by EU membership. Legal intervention in 
collective employment relations (especially in relation to advancing employee 
involvement rights) has been resisted by employers and successive 
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governments (due, in particular, to the perception it would damage the foreign 
direct investment on which Ireland, as a small, open economy, is so 
dependent; Teague, 2004). As a result, the relationships between employers 
and trade unions or other worker representative bodies, and the issue of 
employee voice and involvement at the enterprise have remained largely 
determined by the parties themselves (Redmond, 2004) [2]. 
 
Ireland has, however, diverged from the “pure” Anglo-Saxon model in relation 
to the historical inclination to deal with issues in a centralised manner; in the 
1970s pay agreements were negotiated centrally, and even in periods of free 
collective bargaining like the early 1980s, local bargaining tended to follow 
central trends (Hardiman, 1988). The period since 1987 in Ireland has seen a 
return to centralised bargaining with the conclusion of a succession of national 
social pacts (seven at the time of writing) between the State, employers, trade 
unions and other civil society groups, and the advancement of arguments by 
all the social partners for an orientation towards moderation and partnership. 
Thus, regulation of various aspects of the employment relationship has been 
progressed through what has become known as the social partnership 
process; through the soft law mechanism of voluntary, non-binding social 
pacts. As Teague (2004) points out, the Irish process differs from traditional 
corporatist approaches, as agreements emerge from a high-level process of 
analysis and deliberation by the social partners, focusing on problem-solving 
more than traditional bargaining. However, the process does give labour a 
voice (though the Irish Congress of Trade Unions-ICTU) in relation to labour 
market, and socio-economic, policy formation and implementation. 
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Since the mid-nineties, amid concerns that the process was too focused on 
national public policy, increasing focus has been put on the dissemination of 
partnership to workplace level. With labour granted voice and involvement 
rights at national level (albeit through a voluntary process) the social partners 
outlined a voluntary framework promoting the diffusion of such rights to the 
level of the workplace. The national agreement Partnership 2000 defined 
workplace partnership and identified nine areas in which the concept would be 
particularly apposite (including, inter alia, opportunities for employees to 
contribute to meeting the challenge of global competition, co-operation with 
change, including new forms of work organisation, and financial involvement; 
see paragraph 9.15 of Partnership 2000). Partnership is defined as: 
 
“an active relationship based on recognition of a common interest to 
secure the competitiveness, viability and prosperity of the enterprise. It 
involves a continuing commitment by employees to improvements in 
quality and efficiency; and the acceptance by employers of employees 
as stakeholders with rights and interests to be considered in the 
context of major decisions affecting their employment. 
 
Partnership involves common ownership of the resolution of 
challenges, involving the direct participation of 
employees/representatives and an investment in their training, 
development and working environment”.  
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The discourse of workplace partnership, therefore, is framed in terms of 
solidarity, inclusiveness, participation and workplace democracy. As Dietz et 
al. (2005, p. 290) have pointed out the assumption in the academic literature 
has largely been that any genuine partnership arrangements must involve an 
independent representative body acting on the workforce's behalf (i.e. a trade 
union) and that the “partnership” relationship is considered to be between the 
organisation's management team and the recognised trade union(s). 
However, the presence of a trade union clearly is not necessary for an 
arrangement to fall within the definition of partnership contained in Partnership 
2000. Indeed, the national partnership agreements are quite explicit that no 
prescribed or unitary model of partnership is being promoted, that they merely 
set out a broad indicative agenda, and that partnership arrangements should 
be tailored to the specific organisation. In any case, decreasing trade union 
density, particularly in the private sector, means that in many organisations 
there are no unions with which employers can go into partnership! 
 
Legally grounded employee rights to information and consultation or to input 
into organisational decision-making in Ireland, therefore, have been 
traditionally rather limited. Although certain specific rules relating to worker-
directors have always applied to State-owned companies, the principal 
statutory obligations in Ireland to inform and consult with employees arise 
under legislation dealing with European Works Councils (EWCs), collective 
redundancies, health and safety, and transfer of undertakings. 
 
 9 
This approach to informing and consulting employees represents what Gospel 
et al. (2003, p. 346) term an “event driven disclosure model”. The features of 
such a model are that worker rights are triggered by a specific employer-
initiated event (e.g. redundancy) and therefore information and consultation 
rights tend to be temporary and ad hoc. This model tends to focus on 
procedural justice in a specific context, is palliative rather than preventative, 
and rights granted under such a model have no continuous impact on the 
employment relationship. This contrasts with an “agenda driven disclosure 
model” whereby the trigger lies within a bargaining/consultation agenda, and 
where information and consultation rights cover a range of interlinked issues 
and involve an ongoing relationship between employers and employees.   
 
Nevertheless, the principles of workplace partnership, as framed in the 
national agreements, and other State policy documents (like the National 
Workplace Strategy) seem to be premised on the need for a move away from 
the event driven model of informing and consulting employees to a more 
agenda driven model, which sees employees as important stakeholders with 
rights and responsibilities in respect of the organisation’s performance and 
operation.   
 
Voluntary Failure?  
Recent evidence, however, consistently shows that significant gaps exist in 
relation to voice and involvement arrangements in Irish workplaces.  
Nationally representative data (O’ Connell et al., 2004; Geary, 2006; Geary 
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and Roche, 2005; Gunnigle, 1997; Dundon et al., 2003), despite slight 
differences in approach, sampling and methodology, report a remarkably 
consistent picture. We will look here at just a few illustrative examples (see 
Geary and Roche, 2005 for a fuller review). O’ Connell et al. (2004) reported 
that between 37% and 58% of private sector employees said that they hardly 
ever receive information on areas like the introduction of new products and 
services, changes in work practices and trends in sales and profits. 
Importantly the authors suggest that a wide gap exists between positive 
employer perceptions of information exchange and the (more negative) 
experience of significant numbers of employees (2004, p 38). Dundon et al. 
(2003) similarly found that employees were much more likely than mangers to 
express misgivings about the scope and depth of information and consultation 
at their workplaces; they found Irish organisations to be significantly better at 
informing rather than consulting employees. 
 
It seems, too, that despite the promotion of workplace partnership, its 
significance in terms of prompting more robust voice and involvement 
arrangements appears quite limited. Again, we will take a few illustrative 
examples (see Geary and Roche, 2005 for a comprehensive review of the 
data). O’ Connell et al. (2004) found that just 23% of employees reported 
even the existence of partnership structures at their workplace (18% in the 
private sector); only one quarter of these respondents were personally 
involved in such committees (ibid, p.100). While 39% of employees reported 
working in establishments in which there are no formal partnership 
institutions, no participation arrangements and low consultation, just 6% 
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reported that they work in “high involvement” establishments, where all three 
modes of involvement are present (ibid. p.110). Geary (2006) found that only 
around 15% of employees indicated that some form of Employee Consultative 
Committee was present in their workplace.  
 
Even where partnership structures do exist, the penetration and depth of 
partnership in Ireland appears relatively limited. In unionised workplaces (and 
in the public service, where partnership arrangements are usually most 
prevalent) research indicates that unilateral management decision-making 
remains the most common approach to handling change (Roche, 2000; D’Art 
and Turner, 2003). Geary (2006, p. 145) succinctly sum up his evidence by 
concluding: “what do workers want? Well, they want more voice”.  
 
So Why Can’t the Partners Get it On? 
As noted earlier, employee “voice” and “participation” are complex and 
multifaceted concepts. Thus, investigating the causes of why employees feel 
they lack input or say into their work and organisation’s affairs is fraught with 
difficulty. This section briefly summarises some of the main factors that have 
been identified in the literature to explain the “voice gaps” (and the 
consequent employee discontent) referred to above and that seem to inhibit 
the establishment of more robust employee voice and involvement 
arrangements (be they under the banner of “partnership” or otherwise). 
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One of the main reasons the Directive is likely to have such an impact in 
Ireland and the UK, in particular, is because the voluntarist environment in 
both counties mean that no general, permanent and statutory system of 
information and consultation or employee representation exists. Traditionally, 
trade unions have fulfilled the role of representing employees, but declining 
union density has meant that “union only voice” is now the position in only a 
minority of organisations. Thus, it may be argued that where organisations 
have few, or no, voice and involvement arrangements in place, and where 
trade union membership is not an option, employees are in a weak position to 
advance their case in the absence of any legal rights. Equally, employers may 
be less willing to involve employees in the absence of any statutory 
promptings to do so (Teague, 2004).  
 
Given this lack of institutional support, a major factor influencing the success 
or otherwise of voice and involvement arrangements is the stance of 
management and, where present, trade unions. Information, of course, is 
power and in the inherently unequal employment relationship, management 
may be unwilling to cede such power to employees, much less have 
employees encroaching onto managerial decision-making, through granting 
consultation rights. Thus, the positive effects of voice and involvement 
arrangements tend to be mediated by the level of, in particular, senior 
management support (Dundon et al., 2003). Similarly, the partnership 
literature has frequently emphasised the importance of partnership 
“champions” on the management side (Geary and Roche, 2003; NCPP, 
2002). In both cases, senior management support ten
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those further down the managerial chain. A similar argument can be made in 
terms of trade union support for such arrangements. Unions, and especially 
workplace union representatives, can fear voice mechanisms they perceive to 
be a threat to the union’s representative status (Kessler, 2005). Furthermore, 
Oxenbridge and Brown (2004) have shown that it can be difficult for unions to 
sustain workplace partnerships. Where partnership arrangements are robust, 
workplace representatives privy to commercially sensitive information can feel 
isolated from members, as they may be unable (for reasons of confidentiality) 
to justify a particular union stance. In other cases, especially where 
arrangements are shallow, members can become suspicious that workplace 
representatives have “sold out” to management. Thus, “buy-in” on all sides is 
key (NCPP, 2002). 
 
Management and/or trade union opposition or apathy towards voice and 
involvement arrangements is identified in the literature as having important 
knock-on effects. The failure to promote such arrangements can mean 
employees have low levels of awareness or knowledge of their existence or 
potential (Hall, 2006). This can lead to an under utilisation of such 
arrangements where they do exist, and a lack of employee enthusiasm or 
know-how on whether, or how, to introduce them where they do not. In the 
latter case, employees may, in particular, fear putting their heads “above the 
parapet”. This can lead to further problems in terms of representation. 
Collective mechanisms for informing and consulting employees obviously 
require employee representatives. However, it may be difficult (particularly in 
non-union organisations) to find employees willing and/or able to serve in 
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such a capacity without strong management support for encouraging fair and 
transparent selection procedures and, especially, providing proper training 
(NCPP, 2004). The quality of employee representatives is obviously crucial for 
effective voice arrangements, particularly where they are expected to deal 
with issues to do with economic performance, technological change and so on 
(Gollan, 2006).  
 
Where voice and involvement or partnership arrangements are in place, a lack 
of effective employee representation and management or trade union 
commitment can quickly lead to a lack of faith in the arrangements. In such 
cases, employees may perceive that management seek involvement only on 
“their terms” and only on specific management-driven agendas (Dundon et al., 
2003). In terms of partnership structures, a criticism commonly levelled is that 
partnership fora become mere “talking shops”, with a resulting lack of tangible 
and visible outcomes (Tailby et al., 2004). In many cases, the complaint is 
that what happens in these fora is not effectively communicated to the 
workforce at large, either because they are management-dominated or 
because of failures of articulation on the employee/union side (Oxenbridge 
and Brown, 2004).  
 
Finally, organisations in all sectors today operate in an environment of rapid 
and often disorienting change. It is dealing with the challenges of managing 
change that has to a large extent driven the contemporary focus on employee 
involvement and partnership. However, the literature consistently shows that 
existing voice and participation arrangements, be they under the rubric of 
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partnership (NCPP, 2004) or otherwise seem to be considerably more 
effective in dealing with incremental as opposed to transformative change 
(Dundon et al., 2003). It seems the more fundamental in nature the change 
facing the organisation, the less “say” workers are granted; in such situations, 
information tends to significantly predominate over consultation (ibid, p. 54).  
 
Thus, the evidence suggests important voice gaps in Irish workplaces. It 
seems that information is prioritised over consultation, that a “perception gap” 
exists between employees and employers, and that worker voice expectations 
in most cases are not being met. These gaps have not been addressed by the 
promotion of workplace partnership (through the framework outlined in the 
national agreements or the proselytising of the State-backed National Centre 
for Partnership and Performance-the NCPP). It is this context that the Irish 
Government transposed the Information and Consultation Directive. A 
possibility presented itself, given the thrust of the Directive itself, the 
promotion of employee voice at EU level, and the Irish partnership approach 
at national level, as well as the continued commitment by the social partners 
to promote workplace partnership [3], that the legislation would have been 
transposed in a manner that sought to address the issues identified above. In 
particular, the legislation held out the prospect, at least, of providing a 
stronger institutional framework, in turn “legislatively prompting” (Hall, 2005) 
employers and unions to be more willing to “buy-in” to robust voice or 
partnership arrangements. This, in turn, may have led to greater employee 
awareness of, and faith in, such arrangements and encouraged a “process-
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driven” approach to informing and consulting employees that would support a 
more inclusive approach to managing transformational organisational change. 
 
The Transposition 
The Directive sets out a general framework outlining minimum requirements 
for employee rights to information and consultation. Article 4 requires that 
workers have rights to information on the recent and probable development of 
the undertaking’s activities and economic situation; rights to be informed and 
consulted on the probable development of employment within the undertaking 
(in particular where there is a threat to employment); and rights to be informed 
and consulted on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organisation or in contractual relations (with a view to reaching agreement).  
 
The 2006 Act provides for three types of information and consultation 
agreement but, significantly, rights under the Act must be “triggered”. Section 
7 provides that the employer may initiate negotiations or employees may 
request negotiations with the employer to establish information and 
consultation arrangements. The Act (section 9) provides for pre-existing 
agreements (the retention of existing arrangements or the establishment of 
new arrangements prior to Act’s date of commencement) and new negotiated 
agreements under section 8. Section 7 contains the “Standard Rules”, the 
fallback position for setting up information and consultation arrangements 
where the employer refuses to enter into negotiations or where the parties 
have entered into negotiations but cannot reach agreement within the 
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specified time limit. The key element in the Standard Rules is the 
establishment of an Information and Consultation Forum.  This forum (detailed 
procedural rules for which are laid out in Schedule 3 to the Act) would meet at 
least twice a year, would be resourced by the employer, and, as such, would 
approximate in many ways a works council-type arrangement. 
 
Section 11 has proved one of the more controversial elements of the 
legislation. It provides that, for both negotiated and pre-existing agreements, 
employees may receive information and consultation either through 
representatives or directly. Employees can request a change from a system of 
direct involvement to one involving representatives; such a request would be 
put to a vote. Direct involvement systems are not a feature of the Standard 
Rules.  
 
Section 6 defines employees’ representatives as employees of the 
undertaking elected or appointed for the purposes of the Act (where the 
employer bargains with a trade union that represents 10% or more of the 
employees in the undertaking, that union will have pro-rata representation 
rights). Section 13 prohibits an employer from penalising an employees’ 
representative for performing his or her functions in accordance with the Act.   
 
As with the transposing legislation in the UK (see Hall, 2005; Ewing and 
Truter, 2005) the Act has been the subject of quite critical commentary (see 
Hayes, 2005 on the Bill which became the 2006 Act) and its impact at the time 
of writing has been minimal (Dobbins, 2007). The aim here is not to undertake 
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a detailed legal analysis of the legislation’s strengths and weaknesses, but to 
look at specific areas where the legislation has failed to address the problems 
identified in preceding sections. As a result, the Act also falls someway short 
of advancing the broader EU objectives and social partnership aspirations 
outlined above.  
 
Hard Law, Soft Edge? 
Reactions of the social partners 
Despite the existing lack of legal support for voice and involvement 
arrangements in Ireland and the State’s strong commitment to social 
partnership, it came as little surprise to many that the Irish government initially 
opposed the Directive. Once it became clear its passing was inevitable, 
Ireland and the UK, in particular, pushed for maximum ”flexibility” in terms of 
its requirements (Geary, 2006).  Therefore, a wide scope was given to the 
social partners in each Member State to negotiate terms different to the 
Standard Rules, and sanctions for non-compliance that meant decisions in 
breach of the Directive would be suspended were omitted. Surprisingly, after 
almost 20 years of social partnership Irish trade unions and employers were 
unable to agree a national framework agreement. There is also no mention 
whatsoever of the Directive in the latest national agreement, Towards 2016. I 
will discuss some of the other key “flexible” provisions below, but what is clear 
from the Irish Government’s approach is that statutory measures to enhance 
employee voice and involvement and promote workplace partnership must 
always be introduced without prejudice to managerial prerogative and without 
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threatening the voluntarist system of collective IR. Therefore, any hopes of 
greater institutional support for voice and involvement arrangements through 
a robust form of “legislatively prompted voluntarism” (Hall, 2006) were largely 
dashed.  
 
Much as senior management and union officials set the tone for those at 
middle and lower-levels, it seems likely the State’s minimalist and somewhat 
begrudging response to the Directive will influence employers’ views of the 
2006 Act. As Dundon et al. (2006, p. 508) point out, employers can choose a 
“high road” approach to information and consultation (with a mix of direct and 
representative mechanisms tailored to the organisation and a broad agenda 
allowing for employee co-operation and participation) or a “low road” 
approach (with disjointed processes that minimise employee input into 
decision-making and consolidate management control). Prior to the passing of 
the Act, the available evidence (e.g. NCPP, 2004) suggested that employers’ 
responses to the Directive would very much depend on the detail of the 
legislation. Very few “pre-emptive” information and consultation agreements 
were signed (notable exceptions were the agreements signed at Tesco and 
Hewlett Packard; Dobbins, 2007a) and in the early months since the 
legislation has been in place very little activity has been reported (Dobbins, 
2007). It seems that most employers have adopted a strategy of risk 
assessment rather than active compliance (Hall, 2005). Neither has the union 
movement shown much enthusiasm to promote the Act. The unions seem to 
be uncertain as to whether to view the legislation as an opportunity or a threat 
and have also seemed to adopt a “wait and see” approach.  
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The reaction of the social partners is perhaps the most disappointing, if not 
entirely surprising, aspect of this tale. The success (or, at least, longevity) of 
the process at national level is time and time again attributed in large part (not 
least by the partners themselves) to the relationships of trust that have been 
built by the main players (Hastings et al., 2007). What seems to be important 
is the ”socialisation” aspect of the partnership process; the positive feedback 
loops associated with repeated interactions. The idea is that actors alter pre-
existing preferences, expectations and behaviour, and forge interdependence. 
Case studies of information and consultation processes in organisations, too, 
emphasise that informal dialogue is a crucial element of effective employee 
voice, yet extremely difficult to regulate or legislate for (Dundon et al., 2006; 
Marlow and Gray, 2005). It might have been expected, however, that a more 
robust legislative framework (mandating, for example, some form of 
regularised interaction between employers and employee representatives) 
and a more positive response from employer and trade union leaders might 
have stimulated greater management, employee and employee 
representative interaction, and might have led to increased trust on all sides 
[4]. After all, evidence suggests (NCPP, 2004) that a hard and fast distinction 
between “informing” and “consulting” is not easily maintained in reality. 
Ongoing voice and participation arrangements need to evolve and this 
evolution is dependent to a large extent on the development of personal 
relations between actors. The transposition of the directive, then, represents 
another example of Ireland’s “truncated” model of partnership (what Boucher 
and Collins, 2003, refer to as “neo-liberal corporatism”), where national 
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agreements rely heavily on social partner cooperation and interaction, but no 
mechanisms exist to guarantee social partner engagement at the enterprise 
level (O’ Hagan, 2002). 
 
Pulling the trigger 
A significant weakness in the legislation relates to the fact that employees 
must “trigger” their rights by requesting employers to enter into negotiations to 
establish information and consultation arrangements. The unions have been 
particularly critical of this provision, arguing (in reference to the 10% of 
employees required to trigger a request) that there cannot be “a plebiscite on 
a right” (Geary and Roche, 2005, p. 186). The requirement for workers to 
trigger their rights under the Act is unusual, in the sense that it has never 
previously been a feature of Irish labour law (see the collective redundancies 
legislation, for example). However, where employers do not initiate the 
process it seems employees may have to fight to secure rights under the Act. 
In non-union workplaces (or, indeed, where unions do not promote the 
legislation) it seems unlikely many employees will be aware of their rights, 
and, even if they are, may be unwilling or unable to force their employer’s 
hand. While the legislation contains protection against victimisation for 
employee representatives (section 13) it is silent on protection for those 
seeking to establish arrangements. Speculation that employers are unlikely to 
take a proactive stance on information and consultation rights, as there is little 
expectation of employees requesting these (Hall, 2006) is supported by the 
(admittedly early) evidence. Furthermore, for those employees who do 
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attempt to access their rights, in a case where the 10% threshold is not met, 
two years must pass before a further request can be made (section 7).   
 
By not obligating employers to, at least, begin negotiations, the legislation 
does little to more strongly institutionalise voice and involvement 
arrangements, does nothing to promote employee awareness of their rights, 
makes accessing rights largely dependent on managerial attitudes and gives 
little or no incentive to management to take a proactive approach.  
 
Employee representatives 
A related issue is that of employee representatives. As we have seen (unlike 
in the UK) the legislation does grant a privileged position to workplace 
representatives of recognised trade unions.  However, the definition of 
employee representative does not seem to allow any role for external union 
officials (as does the legislation on EWCs) nor does it seem to allow for 
external expert assistance when the original information and consultation 
arrangements are negotiated. It may be the case that employee 
representatives (or union workplace representatives) will not be experienced 
or skilled enough to effectively negotiate the complex issues of subjects for 
discussion, confidentiality and so on, especially if faced with a phalanx of 
company human resources and legal specialists. Denying employee 
representatives access to external, independent advice undoubtedly runs the 
risk that negotiated arrangements will be management-driven, and thus 
unlikely to address employee concerns about real involvement in decision-
making. There is also a risk that, once arrangements are in place, employee 
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representatives (who after all work for the organisation) will be less able to be 
open and critical in their views, and less able to prevent a management-
dominated agenda without external, independent assistance.  
 
Furthermore, although employee representatives are entitled to “reasonable 
facilities, including time off” (section 13) to fulfil their functions, the extent of 
time and training that they get will be dependent on managerial whim. No 
provision exists, for example, obliging management to facilitate 
representatives to meet periodically with all the other employees they 
represent. If management do not take a progressive approach to the 
arrangements, it is likely that employee representation will be weak and that 
employee apathy or hostility towards the arrangements will increase.  
 
Direct Involvement 
One of the most contentious elements of the legislation is section 11, which 
allows for direct information and consultation arrangements. This has become 
known in Ireland as the “Intel clause” as it is believed to have been furiously 
lobbied for by the American Chamber of Commerce Ireland on behalf of US 
multinationals based in Ireland. While the evidence consistently shows that 
the most successful voice and involvement arrangements are those that 
combine direct and indirect mechanisms (Marchington et al, 2001; Dundon et 
al., 2006; 2003), the legislation again fails to encourage any moves by 
organisational stakeholders towards such a dual approach and in practice, 
arguably, privileges direct voice mechanisms. If employers have the 
opportunity to comply with the letter of the law by using only direct 
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arrangements, there is no incentive to try and comply with the spirit of the 
Directive, which seems to promote a more process-driven, trust-based and 
representative model. The latter would equally seem to better deal with the 
issue of managing more effectively the types of transformational 
organisational changes referred to above.  
 
Practically speaking, it is also difficult to see how a meaningful exchange of 
views and dialogue (the essence of consultation) can take place, or 
agreement be reached, directly in a medium-, or large-sized organisation. 
This provision has also, of course, been a big factor behind the trade union 
ambivalence to the legislation, as it explicitly allows a non-collectivist 
approach. Its inclusion ensured that unions were always going to be sceptical 
of State (and employer) motives and somewhat suspicious of promoting the 
legislation. In any case, the provision might well be the subject of a future 
legal challenge (see Ewing and Truter, 2005 on the UK version of section 11).  
 
Conclusion 
The information and consultation legislation has been described as an 
example of ”reflexive” employment law whereby “the preferred mode of 
intervention is for the law to underpin and encourage autonomous processes 
of adjustment” by the parties to the employment relationship ”rather than to 
intervene by imposing particular distributive outcomes” (Barnard and Deakin, 
2000, p. 341). The social partnership process, with its emphasis on promoting 
workplace partnership, has its origins in the similar (corporatist) idea of the 
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partners “bargaining in the shadow of the law”. The problem with the 2006 Act 
is that the shadow is very faint indeed. The Act also seems to be insufficiently 
encouraging of actors to produce the “second-order effects” intended by 
reflexive law (ibid.). The State and the social partners have not, for example, 
provided as of yet a code of practice or a list of possible topics for information 
and consultation  (like those listed for workplace partnership in Partnership 
2000) and, as noted, the most recent national agreement does not mention 
the legislation at all. 
 
It is necessary to stress the fact that while structures and content of laws are 
important, processes (how actors actually behave) are also critical; legislation 
will inevitably be mediated by employer strategies, union power, existing 
structures, enforcement and so on. Nevertheless, legal supports do affect 
information and consultation outcomes and can, at least, promote or inhibit a 
particular culture (see Gospel and Willman, 2005 on different information and 
consultation outcomes in Germany, France, and the UK). The Irish 
transposition of the EWC directive ten years ago, for example, has had an 
extremely limited impact. That legislation also had a “trigger” mechanism and 
did not even obligate employers to inform the Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment as to whether they had established a European Employees’ 
Forum (as it is termed in the legislation). Research has shown that, as of June 
2005, 43 Irish-owned companies headquartered in Ireland were covered by 
the EWC Directive, of which 6 had established EWCs – a “compliance rate” of 
just 14% (Dobbins, 2006). It would be a pity were the 2006 Act to have a 
similarly limited impact.  
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While the framework for workplace partnership in the national agreements 
seems to have had limited effect as a means of promoting more robust voice 
and involvement arrangements, the 2006 Act could have been framed in a 
manner to encourage greater interaction between workplace actors in a more 
process-driven approach. Using legislation to promote a shift in workplace 
culture is clearly desirable in an era where numbers of collective disputes are 
at an all time low, but where third party dispute resolution is increasing 
exponentially (LRC, 2007) using an individualistic approach to issues that 
often might better be the subject of collective negotiation.  
 
It seems unlikely, given the manner of the transposition, that EU level 
ambitions, as set out in the preamble to the Directive, will be met in the Irish 
case [5]. Similarly, the transposition does little to suggest that the nature of 
Irish social partnership will become a little less “truncated”; while successive 
national agreements have argued the need for practical approaches and 
activities to further develop employee voice and involvement arrangements (in 
particular through workplace partnership) it seems such approaches and 
activities will not be achieved by legislatively grounded promptings (even of 
the “reflexive” nature).  
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Notes 
1. For the purposes of this paper, I am going to use the catch-all term 
“voice and involvement arrangements” as shorthand for the various 
voice and participation mechanism identified in the literature cited. 
2. One obvious exception relates to legislation dealing with trade union 
representation in organisations where trade unions are not recognised 
for bargaining purposes (the Industrial Relations Acts 2001-2004). 
3. See Part Two, section 6.4 of Towards 2016: “The Forum on the 
Workplace of the Future concluded that there is a continued need for 
advocacy of partnership at workplace level, in accordance with 
previous social partnership agreements. The NCPP will develop a 
detailed project plan in 2006, in consultation with ICTU, IBEC (Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation) and relevant Government 
Departments and agencies, outlining a series of practical approaches 
and activities to further develop workplace partnership.”  
4. Of course, just as repeated interaction can increase trust and create 
positive “spillover” effects, there is a chance that such interactions 
could have the opposite effect and create negative “spillback” effects 
(Teague and Donaghey, 2004). Nevertheless, where a stated policy 
aim is to increase communication between parties, having them meet 
and talk on a regular basis must have a role.  
5. The directive set out to “to reform the existing legal frameworks for 
employee information and consultation at Community and national 
level, which tend to adopt an excessively a posteriori approach to the 
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process of change… strengthen dialogue and promote mutual trust 
within undertakings in order to improve risk anticipation, make work 
organisation more flexible and facilitate employee access to training 
within the undertaking while maintaining security, make employees 
aware of adaptation needs, increase employees' availability to 
undertake measures and activities to increase their employability, 
promote employee involvement in the operation and future of the 
undertaking and increase its competitiveness”. 
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